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Abstract
Telemetry is the automated sensing and collection of data from a remote device. It is often used to provide better 
services for users. Microsoft uses telemetry to periodically collect information about Windows systems and to help 
improve user experience and fix potential issues. Windows telemetry service functions by creating RBS files on the 
local system to reliably transfer and manage the telemetry data, and these files can provide useful information in a 
digital forensic investigation. Combined with the information derived from traditional Windows forensics, investigators 
can have greater confidence in the evidence derived from various artifacts. It is possible to acquire information that 
can be confirmed only for live systems, such as the computer hardware serial number, the connection records for 
external storage devices, and traces of executed processes. This information is included in the RBS files that are 
created for use in Windows telemetry. In this paper, we introduced how to acquire RBS files telemetry and analyzed 
the data structure of these RBS files, which are able to determine the types of information that Windows OS have 
been collected. We also discussed the reliability and the novelty by comparing the conventional artifacts with the RBS 
files, which could be useful in digital forensic investigation.
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1. Introduction
Telemetry is used to periodically and remotely 
collect environmental data from a target system in 
order to provide better services. Its main functions 
are the automated sensing, measurement of data, 
and control of remote devices. It is commonly used 
in computers, automobiles, medical devices, and 
many industries [1]. A widespread example of this 
technology in use involves Microsoft, who first 
introduced telemetry to their ecosystem with the 
launch of Windows 10 under the service name 
'DiagTrack'. This service is configured to send back 
various types of information, including the user 
experience and telemetry components, as a way of 
reporting errors, thus helping improve the quality of 
its services. Users can opt out of this service, but 
it is set to operate by default [2]. Since the usage 
share of Windows 7 and later versions accounts for 
more than 95% [3], most operating systems can be 
used functionally through the update.
Forensic analysis of Window telemetry is im-
portant for two reasons. First, it can provide the 
same results as those gained from other artifacts. 
Windows artifacts include the Master File Table 
(MFT), Registry, Web History, Event Log, Prefetch, 
shortcuts, and so on. By analyzing these artifacts in 
a digital forensic investigation, a collection of 
events organized as a timeline is able to be 
constructed. The RBS files used for Windows tele-
metry contain some of the same information as in 
others. This means that any examination of a target 
system will be more reliable than if the information 
was derived from only a single artifact. It also can 
be a potential countermeasure against anti-forensic 
techniques, such as data manipulation or erasure of 
the digital evidence. The second reason is that it 
can provide new information that cannot be ex-
tracted in a conventional investigation. For example, 
the unique value of hardware device identifiers, 
such as an HDD, an SSD, external storage or a 
RAM card, and running process lists are only visi-
ble during live forensics. This information can only 
be extracted from RBS files and it could be useful 
in a digital forensic investigation. In particular, 
Windows telemetry has not been studied so far.
Therefore, in this paper, we describe the data 
structure of these RBS files and their content in 
comparison to other Windows artifacts. We also 
discuss how they can be used in digital forensic 
investigations.
2. Background
What is the Windows telemetry? Traditional 
models using ICMP, SNMP have been used to col-
lect operational statistics from a system or network, 
but have several restrictions due to the growth of 
the objects like IoT devices and cloud-based appli-
cations [4]. Responding to this limitation, telemetry 
File name Filetype
Version of Windows 10
1507 1511 1607 17031709 18031809
events00.rbs 0x00 24,576 49,152 - - -
events01.rbs 0x01 6,226 12,452 - - -
events10.rbs 0x03 492 984 - - -
events11.rbs 0x02 1,475 2,950 - - -
Events_Normal.rbs 0x00 - - 1,6384 1,6384 1,6384
Events_NormalCritical.rbs 0x01 - - 6,554 6,554 6,554
Events_CostDeferred.rbs 0x02 - - 6,554 6,554 6,554
Events_Realtime.rbs 0x03 - - 3,277 3,277 3,277
Table 1 File names and sizes(kilobytes) of the RBS files
Figure 1. The overall structure of the Windows telemetry (RBS file) for the diagnostics
is a new approach for monitoring and control 
where data is streamed continuously and provides 
almost real-time access to operational statistics. 
Automated sensing and measurement of data is sent 
from a remote device to a central control point, 
and in this case of the Windows telemetry it is 
sent to Microsoft.
Windows telemetry with DiagTrack service 
works by calling ‘svchost.exe’ process with the file 
‘%SystemRoot%\System32\diagtrack.dll’. Usually, it 
transmits telemetry data (i.e., diagnostic data) every 
15 minutes, though this can vary depending on the 
power options and network settings. If a certain 
event occurs, DiagTrack checks its own status and 
writes the telemetry data to files with the .rbs 
extension in ‘%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Diagnosis\’ 
directory on the local system. Parts of these files 
are later sent as payloads with the HTTPS protocol 
based on TLS. This means that if an error occurs 
during system operation, the relevant data is stored 
in files first and then sent at the scheduled time. 
Windows telemetry is categorized into four levels: 
Security, Basic, Enhanced, and Full [5]. The higher 
the level, the more information that is recorded in 
the local system and could be sent to Microsoft.
Similar to Windows telemetry, there is an 
office telemetry, which is a part of compatibility 
monitoring framework [6]. This data is collected by 
agent from office applications and it includes 
document’s details like a file name, file size, 
author, last updated time, and so on [7]. Since 
office telemetry data substantially enriches metadata 
it helps to create timelines [8], this will be useful 
in case of investigation for the enterprise controlled 
by organization. These office telemetry is stored in 
SQL server, however, Windows telemetry save in a 
new file format, which has an file extension of 
'RBS', rather than to the SQL databases. Therefore, 
this paper describes the structure of the RBS file 
that stores Window telemetry and how to use 
digital forensic investigation.
3. Analysis of the RBS files
3.1 Acquisition and Format Internals
To acquire the RBS files from active (live) 
system, the related services should be terminated 
first and then copy the target. If there is a disk 
image file, the RBS files need to be identified by 
filesystem analysis and then extract them. RBS files 
have different names and a fixed size depending on 
the version of Windows being used, as shown in 
Table 1. The data structure and telemetry event 
data also differ between versions. Windows 
telemetry has been in use since the launch of 
Windows 10, but Windows 7 or later is also 
supported through an update. In this case, the data 
structure and characteristics are the same as those 
of the 1507 version. The file names and the fixed 
size have changed since Windows 10 version 1607. 
Depending on when you update Windows, both 
versions of files can exist. For example, if it was 
installed and had used the 1507 version and then 
updated to the 1803 version, then both 'events00.rbs' 
and 'Events_Normal.rbs' will be there.
RBS files are composed of a file header and 
data chunks, and different forms of telemetry data 
are recorded within a data chunk. Fig. 1 shows the 
structure of the typical RBS file. The number of 
data chunks is related to how long the system has 
Offset Size Description
0x00 8 Signature
 ∙ 1507, 1511 versions: UTCRBES3
 ∙ 1607 version: UTCRBES5
 ∙ 1703 version: UTCRBES7
 ∙ 1709, 1803 versions : UTCRBES8
0x08 8 Timestamp: Last modified time
 ∙ Windows: 64bit hex value – little endian
0x10 4 Start offset of the last written data chunk 1
0x14 4 Start offset of the last written data chunk 2
0x18 4 Size of the last written data chunk
0x1C 4 Total size of the data chunks
0x20 4 Index of the last written data chunk 1
0x24 4 Index of the last written data chunk 2
0x28 2 file type
 ∙ 0x00: Events_Normal.rbs
 ∙ 0x01: Events_NormalCritical.rbs
 ∙ 0x02: Events_CostDeferred.rbs
 ∙ 0x03: Events_Realtime.rbs
0x2A 11 reserved (for the 1607 version or higher)
Table 2. Data structure of the file header
Offset Size Description
0x00 4 CRC-32 value of telemetry data
0x04 4 Index of the telemetry data
0x08 4 Size of the Base64 encoded data
0x0C 4 Size of the DEFLATE compressed data
0x10 4 Count of the telemetry data
0x14 2 reserved
0x16 variable Base64 encoded data
- variable DEFLATE compressed data (JSON)
Table 3. Data structure of the data chunk
been used. Because the size of the files is fixed, 
unused areas where telemetry data has never been 
recorded is padded with 0x00. If the telemetry data 
to be recorded exceeds the size of the 
corresponding file, it is overwritten from an offset 
after the file header where data from the past is 
stored. When the Windows telemetry service is 
terminated, the RBS files are retained, but no 
additional telemetry data is created. Upon restarting 
the service, new telemetry data is appended after 
the existing data.
The file header (Table 2) is located at the 
beginning of the RBS file. The structure of the file 
header differs slightly between Windows 10 
versions but it can be identified by a signature, 
which is 8 bytes and contains 'UTCRBES' in ASCII 
code. It has a timestamp which represents the last 
time the telemetry data was modified and contains 
an offset and index for storing new telemetry data. 
The offset and the index have two fields each. 
Most of them in the dataset have the same values; 
only when the service had halted while the samples 
were being collected, there was a slight difference. 
Contents in the telemetry data have the own 
attribution depending on the 'name' value, like all 
Windows Event Log have a unique event ID, and 
each RBS files have the certain contents by 'file 
type' values.
After the file header, the data chunks are 
stored, which is the area corresponding to the pay-
load for the telemetry service. The telemetry data 
which generated by periodically monitoring the state 
of the system is compressed and then stored. The 
size of the generated data chunk is variable because 
the frequency of checking the system status varies 
according to the value of 'name'. Details of the data 
chunks and their fields are shown in Table 3. 
Base64 encoded data from the offset 0x16 uses the 
‘=’ padding character and it needs further analysis 
in the future because the decoded data with Base64 was 
highly random. For the compressed data in the data 
chunk, a string in the JSON [9] object format can 
be extracted by decompressing with DEFLATE al-
gorithm [10], and this JSON string is consist of the 
collection of key/value pairs with several keys (ver, 
name, time, flag, os, osVer, appId, appVer, etc.) 
and two objects (ext and data). The telemetry data 
is contained in the content of the JSON object and 
is configured differently within this object according 
to the 'name' value. This can provide the basis for 
digital forensic analysis.
3.2 Attributions of the Windows telemetry 
RBS files contains that can help to determine 
a user’s behavior and their system’s environmental 
settings in a digital forensic investigation. 
Furthermore, since some of them cannot be identi-
fied in a conventional investigation, we can call the 
rbs file a new artifact. Diagnostic Data Viewer 
[11], which has been supported since Windows 10 
version 1803, can be employed to check the 
Windows telemetry, but this program is functionally 
limited because this works only for the active sys-
tem and it shows the parts of stored data. In this 
section, we demonstrate how to obtain telemetry data 
from the RBS files.
For analysis and verification, we acquired 340 RBS 
files from Windows 7/8.1/10, which support the 
telemetry service, and identified a number of 'name' 
values, exactly 237 events, from more than two 
million telemetry data sets. The oldest timestamp 
was recorded a year earlier and we checked cases 
that telemetry data was overwritten if it's generated more 
than the fixed size of the RBS file. Diagnostic 
events and fields can be partially determined be-
cause Microsoft has released information about tele-
metry data [12-14], but we confirmed that is a part of 
the document and have studied to be used as new 
information in the digital forensic investigations. We 
uploaded the dataset of the telemetry data and the 
RBS file parser developed in this study.
[https://github.com/JaehyeokHan/Windows-Telemetry]
Figure 3. Hardware device identifier from the telemetry data, 
which name is 'Microsoft.Windows.Inventory.General.Inventory
MiscellaneousPhysicalDiskInfoAdd'
Figure 2. An example of the hardware device identifier by WMIC command on the system in action (live). The red boxed one is 
the device identified in the telemetry of Figure 3.
Property 1. OS and application life cycle. Telemetry 
data contains information on Windows OS installation 
and the addition and removal of applications. 
Typically, the source of this information is the 
Registry [15] and the Event Log. The telemetry data 
contains information such as the product name, 
owner, Windows version, product ID, installation 
date, product keys for activation, which are same 
with the Registry's. The advantage here is that an 
investigator is able to gain a record of the point at 
which the data was acquired and thus gains an 
overview of the history of the target system. If 
Windows 7 updated to Windows 10, the Registry 
would change the installation time to the time of 
the update, rather than recording the time when 
Windows 7 was originally installed. In this case, 
the filesystem log(metadata) needs to be inves-
tigated, but telemetry data provides this history 
from the initial system because telemetry data re-
cords all life cycle of both installations and re-
movals for the OS and applications.
Property 2. Hardware device information. Hardware 
device identifiers and connection traces are 
contained. In terms of hardware device identifiers, 
an information from the Registry has a limitation 
for the mainboard (base board), monitor, optical 
disc drive (ODD), and a part of the network 
interface controller (NIC). But telemetry data 
includes more detailed specification information, 
such as the model name, serial number, disk 
partitions state, mainboard, CPU, RAM, and all 
storage devices including internals and externals. 
First of all, this information about devices identifier 
is the same as the output of the Windows 
Management Instrumentation Command-line (WMIC) 
[16]. Fig. 2 and 3 are the example showing that 
the information of the telemetry data is same as 
the output of WMIC for the property 2. Also if the 
type and brand of digital devices needs to be 
documented [17], the telemetry data make it 
possible to confirm with what are actually checked.
User data from applications like Messenger is 
often encrypted and most of the encryption key is 
generated using a hardware-inherent value. In this 
case, hardware-specific information is able to give 
us chances to look into the decrypted user data. 
Additionally, it is useful to track devices connection 
history like the changes and the usage of external 
storage with a target system, in particular detail 
events about the driver installed (initial connection), 
connection and disconnection. Some of traces includes 
the Registry and Event Log [19].
Property 3. Process execution history. Process name 
and the timestamp of the running process is 
collected at the Enhanced and Full level. This 
property was only able to be identified with live 
forensics but the analysis of telemetry data makes 
it possible to collect process execution history. 
Previously, only the name of an executable, a count 
of how many times it has been run, and a 
timestamp indicating the last time it was run were 
available from Prefetch, Icon Cache [18], and Event 
Log. In case of the Event Log, security policy 
setting is particularly required to be established for 
a forensic readiness rather than leave the default. 
As a result of analysis using our dataset in the 
several system environment, this property were 
stored for about three month. Hence, a long-term 
patterns of the cyberattack such as APT (Advanced 
Persistent Threat) can remain and the execution of 
malicious code or portable programs would be 
detected. There were events with different 'name' 
values for applications developed by Microsoft such 
as Skype, Outlook, OneDrive, to diagnose them in 
shorter-term cycle compare to the third party 
application.
Property 4. Boot sector and partition table. The 
RBS files store boot timestamps and raw data of 
the boot sector data―MBR (Master Boot Record), 
VBR (Volume Boot Record) or GPT (GUID Partition 
Table). The MBR has a partition table so it is able 
to record changes in the partitions on a disk. When 
a system damaged by a boot sector virus [20], it 
can be restored using the boot record data stored 
as telemetry data.
Property Name Source(file type)
OS and 
application life 
cycle
 Census.OS Events_Realtime.rbs(0x03)
 Microsoft.Windows.Inventory.Core.InventoryApplicationAdd
 Microsoft.Windows.Inventory.Core.InventoryApplicationRemove
 Microsoft.Windows.Kernel.Power.OSStateChange
Events_NormalCritical.rbs
(0x01)
Hardware device 
information
 Census.Hardware
 Census.Storage
 Census.Memory
 Census.Processor
Events_Realtime.rbs
(0x03)
 Microsoft.Windows.Inventory.General.InventoryMiscellaneousPhysicalDiskInfoAdd
 Microsoft.Windows.Inventory.Core.InventoryDevicePnpAdd
 Microsoft.Windows.Inventory.Core.InventoryDevicePnpRemove
 Microsoft.Windows.Inventory.Core.InventoryDeviceContainerAdd
 Microsoft.Windows.Inventory.Core.InventoryDeviceContainerRemove
 Microsoft.Windows.Inventory.Core.InventoryDriverPackageAdd
Events_NormalCritical.rbs
(0x01)
Process 
execution history
 Win32kTraceLogging.AppInteractivitySummary
 Win32kTraceLogging.PostUpdateUseInfo
 Microsoft.Windows.Narrator.Asimov.NarratorCommandGeneratedStart
 Microsoft.Windows.HangReporting.AppHangEvent
 Microsoft.OneDrive.Sync.Updater.ComponentInstallState
Events_NormalCritical.rbs
(0x01)
 Microsoft.Windows.Skype.Host.UserLoggedIn
 Microsoft-Windows-Store.StoreLaunching
Events_Normal.rbs
(0x00)
Boot sector and 
partition table
 Microsoft.Windows.Inventory.General.InventoryMiscellaneousMbrDiskAdd
 Microsoft.Windows.Inventory.General.InventoryMiscellaneousGptDiskAdd
 Microsoft.Windows.Kernel.Power.OSStateChange
Events_NormalCritical.rbs
(0x01)
Table 4. Classification of the properties by 'name' values and sources for the Windows telemetry formatted the JSON object
name: Microsoft.Windows.Inventory.Core.InventoryApplicationAdd
This event was made when the 7-zip had installed. An information
of the application (publisher, version, language) and the application installation
timestamp are verified. If application comes from the Microsoft store are 
more specifically.
name: Win32kTraceLogging.AppInteractivitySummary
This event was made when the Google chrome was running 
and the process name and the timestamp are verified at that time. 
A list of processes that were running at a particular time is able 
to be obtained, even though it is difficult for an application to 
specify the start and end times.
Figure 4. Examples of the telemetry data for property 1 (application life cycle: installation) and 3 (Process execution history).
Figure 5. Comparison of the information that artifacts contains when events occurred: Windows telemetry, Registry, Event Log, Prefetch, 
WMIC (in case of live forensics).
4. Discussion
Windows telemetry RBS files are worth 
analyzing because telemetry data can be useful for 
understanding a target system. However, this is a 
new Windows artifact, so there are few previous 
digital forensic cases to refer to. Therefore, we 
present two situations as examples and discuss how 
the RBS files can be used in a digital forensic 
investigation as a fig. 5. This figure compares the 
history of the four artifacts when Windows is 
installed and updated, when system error occurs, 
when the application is installed, when process 
runs, and USB connection events occurs.
Windows artifacts (e.g. Registry, Prefetch, Event 
Log) have traces only when certain events occur due 
to user actions or system reservations but the RBS 
files store periodically and repeatedly regardless of 
the specific behavior. This differentiation enables 
telemetry data to give reliability to the results of 
analyzing other artifacts and additionally identifies 
traces that could not be identified prior to the 
traditional Windows forensics.
4.1 Case-study
Incident response. An incident response allows 
an organization to understand a data breach and 
prepare for future security incidents. In an incident 
response, collecting records of the event is the most 
fundamental requirement, and the system monitor 
(Sysmon) [21] and Google Rapid Response (GRR) 
[22] are widely used for this purpose. They provide 
detailed information about the incident, so an inves-
tigator can identify malicious or anomalous activity 
and understand how attackers or malware operated 
on the target system. The reason why RBS files 
are valuable is that they are a product of Windows 
10 default settings and will thus be present even if 
Sysmon or GRR are not, both of which require an 
additional download. Of the properties of telemetry 
data described above, process execution history 
(Property 3) is probably the most useful. However, 
there is a possibility that an event can be missed. 
If the process is executed in a short time, it’s not 
possible to catch this events because the service 
does not collect the telemetry data in real time. 
When the MBR is damaged due to a cyberattack 
including a boot sector virus, it’s also possible to 
recover a system which can’t boot up using 
Property 5. In addition, the periodic configuration 
values of the other telemetry data allow to track 
changes in settings for an incident response.
IT audit and Anti-forensics. As a response to 
cyberattack such as intellectual property theft via 
unauthorized access, an IT audit can facilitate an 
understanding of the operating environment and the 
corresponding controls. During this type of 
investigation, it may be found that anti-forensic 
techniques such as a data hiding or artifact wiping 
have been employed. It is thus important to gain as 
many records as possible. If an auditor can acquire 
the same information from different artifacts, the 
reliability of the data improves; even if anti-forensic 
activity has been employed on one artifact, the 
missing information can be found in other artifacts. 
The RBS files provide a wealth of useful 
information in this regard. For example, over one 
year’s worth of information on the Windows update 
history and records of applications installed and 
uninstalled on the target system (Property 1) is 
available. If data leakage has occurred, tracing the 
connection of USB devices (Property 2) can also 
be used to identify the leak. If the suspect 
communicated with outsiders through a messenger 
service, the chat log can be decrypted using a 
hardware device identifier (Property 2). Furthermore, 
the timestamps in the telemetry data, in conjunction 
with the Event Log, can be used to track the 
running time of the target system, which can then 
act as a countermeasure against anti-forensic activity 
such as the modification of metadata.
4.2 Consideration and Future works
With a rise of IoT (Internet of Things) 
devices, telemetry is used throughout the industry 
and a related project [23] is underway for an 
effective observability. Diagnostics in Window 10 
has also being updated constantly and the resulting 
the structure of the RBS file varied slightly and 
increased the types of the event depending on the 
version of the Windows Telemetry. Thus it needs a 
systematic support to manage a list of the telemetry 
data as a database to use telemetry data in digital 
forensic investigation, just like classifying Event 
Log by event ID. Only then will investigators be 
able to use Window telemetry as an artifact and to 
filter many events by the 'name' value. As shown 
in Table 1, the RBS file size is not very large 
because it is stored in a compressed data using the 
JSON file format, but it have more events than 
expected. Compared to the fact that NTFS 
filesystem logs are kept for less than a week on 
average experimentally, telemetry data has quite 
long trace for a target system or a disk dump 
image file because it has over the three months of 
process execution history and about one year of 
other properties. In this regard, an experiment is 
required for the cycle of an event depending on the 
key value of 'epoch'.
Additionally, we analyzed the RBS files but 
some of the data needs to be keep studying. In 
case of base64 encoded fields, reverse engineering 
analysis is required and then we will be able to 
determine whether personally identifiable information 
(PII) is included in order to address privacy 
concerns. Since PII have not found so far and 
Microsoft stated privacy principles with no personal 
content [24]. In fact, we've monitored network 
traffic that telemetry data is sent to Microsoft using 
TLS (Transport Layer Security) protocol that 
provides secure communications.
5. Conclusion
Microsoft has run a Windows telemetry 
service since the launch of Windows 10, collecting 
system data to enhance user experience. The traces 
collected as part of Windows telemetry is stored in 
the RBS files. We analyzed those data structure, 
and explored at least the valuable five properties, 
which the telemetry data contained history about 
the operating system and application installation, 
hardware device, process execution, external storage, 
and the boot sector. We also discussed how these 
can be used in digital forensic investigations. To 
date, Window telemetry RBS files have not been 
employed as artifacts in traditional Windows 
forensics. However, they contain a mix of old and 
new information and are thus worth analyzing.
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